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ADDRESSING THE RETIREMENT CRISIS
WITH SHADOW 401(K)S
Deepa Das Acevedo*
INTRODUCTION
The United States has been juggling a handful of socio-economic
crises lately. The subprime mortgage crisis, the auto industry crisis, the
education crisis, the obesity crisis—the list isn’t short and shows no signs
of becoming so. Within this group of economically and socially disruptive
developments, the “retirement crisis”—the idea that most Americans will
lack the financial resources to be secure and relatively satisfied in their
golden years—seems somewhat banal because, for the most part, it has yet
to hit. Even though baby boomers first started to age out of the workforce
1
in 2011, the real cost of underfunded retirement is far less palpable than
are the evictions, layoffs, and stock market fluctuations accompanying
other difficult changes.
But the retirement crisis may prove to be one of the most damaging
developments facing contemporary America. It invites procrastination, it’s
remarkably immune to class and industry distinctions, and it’s actually two
2
exceedingly complex problems. On the one hand, most Americans aren’t
saving smartly or aggressively enough while they work, so the pot of
money available to them at retirement is markedly insufficient. On the
© 2016 Deepa Das Acevedo. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. AB, Princeton
University (2006); PhD, University of Chicago (2013); JD, University of Chicago (2016).
My thanks to Chuck Wolf for comments on an earlier version of this paper and, as always,
to John Felipe Acevedo. This Essay won the 2016 Alvin D. Lurie Memorial Award from
the American College of Employee Benefits Counsel.
1 See D’vera Cohn & Paul Taylor, Baby Boomers Approach 65—Glumly, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/12/20/babyboomers-approach-65-glumly/?beta=true&utm_expid=53098246-2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsgKopIg.1&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pewresearch.org%2Ftopics%2Fbabyboomers%2Fpages%2F2%2F.
2 See EDWARD N. WOLFF, ECON. POLICY INST., RETIREMENT INSECURITY: THE
INCOME SHORTFALLS AWAITING THE SOON-TO-RETIRE 2 (2002).
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other hand, and regardless of whether they’ve saved enough during their
working years, most Americans aren’t properly managing or capable of
properly managing their savings after they retire.
These problems are challenging enough in themselves, but they
become even more complicated if we focus on solutions that are politically
feasible in the United States. For better or for worse, when it comes to
3
welfare state policies, we aren’t Denmark. This doesn’t mean that we
shouldn’t reach a little in our efforts to address the retirement crisis—after
all, a “crisis” demands “crisis management.” But we need to work towards
viable solutions, and we have to keep in mind that no solution is perfect.
This Essay is a contribution toward that effort.
I.

THE “SAVINGS PROBLEM”

This Part explores three reasons why most Americans do not have
enough savings accumulated by the time they retire: bad worker defaults,
bad employer incentives, and low income. The Part also introduces
“Shadow 401(k)s” as a means of addressing the “savings problem.”
A. Bad Worker Defaults
A host of default practices virtually ensure that workers do not save
4
enough during their earning years for reasons other than a lack of money.
Workers may simply choose to allocate resources to things other than a
retirement plan. Workers may also fail to undertake crucial trigger actions,
like enrolling in a defined contribution plan, choosing a fund into which to
invest, or contributing enough to receive matching benefits from their
employers. This general problem—now a staple of cocktail conversations
5
everywhere, thanks to Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler —was
significantly, if belatedly, addressed by the Pension Protection Act of 2006
6
(PPA).
The PPA grants a safe harbor to 401(k) plan sponsors who adopt
automatic enrollments, employer contributions, default investments into

3 See Hillary Clinton, U.S. Presidential Candidate, The CNN Democratic
Presidential Debate in Las Vegas, Nev. (Oct. 13, 2015) (transcript available from The CNN
Democratic
Debate
Transcript,
Annotated,
WASH.
POST:
THE
FIX,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/13/the-oct-13-democraticdebate-who-said-what-and-what-it-means/) (“But we are not Denmark. I love Denmark.
We are the United States of America.”).
4 See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX. REV. 471, 481–83 (2004).
5 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 103–17 (2008).
6 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 7, 19, 26, 29, 30 U.S.C. (2012)).

40

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 92
7

age-appropriate funds, and automatic increases in worker-contributions.
In return for establishing these defaults, the plan sponsor gets a safe harbor
from undertaking expensive and complicated non-discrimination
8
compliance testing respecting their plans and matching programs. In
effect, the PPA has meant that millennials have almost always lived in a
universe where contributions to retirement plans happen as a matter of
9
course.
There’s a lot to like about the PPA, but it’s not all jam. For one, the
PPA does not supplant previously available safe harbor provisions, so plan
sponsors don’t have to adopt PPA-compliant plans in order to gain its
10
benefits.
Secondly, the PPA actually lengthens the vesting period for
employers’ matching contributions from “immediate[ly]” to “two years of
11
service.”
While we don’t know whether workers opt out more when
matching benefits don’t vest immediately, this is just one more reason why
we shouldn’t view the PPA as a cure-all for “trigger action” defaults.
The biggest problem with relying on the PPA to increase savings rates
is, of course, that employers need not establish any kind of pension plan let
12
alone one that takes advantage of PPA safe harbor standards.
As of
March 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that “[e]mployerprovided retirement benefits were available to 31 percent of private
13
industry workers in the lowest wage category.” If we want to take the
retirement crisis seriously, it simply won’t do to gloat (or sigh) over the
PPA while ignoring the fact that workers at the low end of the earning
spectrum often lack any job-related infrastructure to save for retirement.
So what are our options? This Essay suggests authorizing the Social
Security Administration (SSA) to create federally administered (though not

7 See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. 3998 (REV. 10-2015),
CHOOSING A RETIREMENT SOLUTION FOR YOUR SMALL BUSINESS 5 (2015),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/choosing.html; Jack VanDerhei, The Pension
Protection
Act
and
401(k)s,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Apr.
22,
2008),
http://online.wsj.com/ad/employeebenefits-pension_protection_act.html.
8 See VanDerhei, supra note 7.
9 See JEAN A. YOUNG, VANGUARD, THE AUTO SAVINGS GENERATION: STEERING
MILLENNIALS
TO
BETTER
RETIREMENT
OUTCOMES
15
(2015),
https://institutional.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/institutional/researchcommentary/article/I
nvResSteerMillennials.
10 See Daniel P. Schwallie & Allen Steinberg, How Safe Is Your ADP/ACP Safe
Harbor?, 29 BENEFITS Q., Oct. 2013, at 35, 35–36.
11 Id. at 36.
12 See Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_pension.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2015).
13 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Benefits
in
the
United
States—March
2015
(July
24,
2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ebs2_07242015.htm.
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federally guaranteed) defined contribution plans with PPA-like defaults
regarding enrollment and age-appropriate fund selection, as well as a
default annuity purchase at retirement. The plans would allow individuals
who are interested in more actively managing their savings to select from a
limited range of age-appropriate portfolios at predetermined intervals, but
the options and the opportunities to act would be purposefully minimal.
Let’s call these “Shadow 401(k)s”—shadow because they’re meant to
follow workers of all types throughout their professional lives, and also
because they aren’t the main event or a one-size-fits-all solution to the
retirement crisis.
Essentially, this approach encourages workers who lack employersponsored plans to save more than they pay in Social Security taxes, but
spares them from having to select, establish, and maintain a plan
themselves. Expanding on the SSA’s existing infrastructure (rather than
expanding Supplemental Security Income (SSI) taxes) has the advantage of
minimizing administrative expenses without triggering politically charged
tax debates. Instituting simple defaults allows us to capitalize on the
lessons learned from the PPA but leaves some room for individualization—
again, unlike SSI taxes. And structuring the plans as defined contribution
funds helps avoid the political baggage that is likely to accompany talk of a
14
15
“federal annuity” or a “universal savings account.”
Because it does not involve federal contributions or risk-bearing, the
Shadow 401(k) differs from similar proposals put forward by, among
16
17
others, Teresa Ghilarducci and Michael Calabrese.
This naturally
makes the Shadow 401(k) a more incremental response to the retirement
crisis and invites—indeed, likely necessitates—alteration down the road.
And forced savings without a federal guarantee, savings credit, or matching
feature increases the burden on low-wage earners at a time when they are
already hurting.
However, these features may also make the Shadow 401(k) more
legislatively viable in a period of considerable political tumult and
decreased bipartisan support for similar plans, while simultaneously
addressing many of the major problems that scholars like Ghilarducci and
14 But cf. Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k)
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 277, 320–30
(2010) (advocating for a “government-subsidized annuity”).
15 The “Universal Savings Account” plan President Clinton floated in the late 1990s
required the federal government to match any percentage of savings. See George Hager &
Amy Goldstein, Clinton Details New Retirement Plan, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/security/stories/accounts041599.htm.
16 See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ECON. POLICY INST., GUARANTEED RETIREMENT
ACCOUNTS: TOWARD RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 17 (2007).
17 See MICHAEL CALABRESE, NEW AM. FOUND., FACING UP TO THE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS DEFICIT: FROM 401(K)S TO UNIVERSAL AND AUTOMATIC ACCOUNTS 13 (2011).
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Calabrese have identified in current or proposed retirement systems.
19
Indeed, some states have approximated this approach. Starting in 2017,
for instance, Illinois “will automatically enroll workers without a
retirement account into a portable, state-run individual retirement plan
20
called the Secure Choice Pension.” Programs like Secure Choice have
the same advantages and disadvantages as the Shadow 401(k), but with the
added weakness that they depend upon the political climate of individual
states. The Shadow 401(k) provides a feasible federal foundation on which
we can build as the opportunity arises and—while we wait—offers a small
step towards ensuring that Americans have more money waiting for them at
21
retirement.
B. Bad Employer Incentives
Just as the current system doesn’t give workers the best incentives to
save, it also doesn’t encourage employers to help workers save. To begin
with, employers have little reason to take on the responsibilities and costs
of sponsoring a retirement plan in a climate where workers change jobs
frequently. The average baby boomer worker has held 11.7 jobs between
22
the ages of eighteen and forty-eight, and the average wage and hour job is
23
now held for around 4.6 years. These figures aren’t significantly higher
today than they were before the 2008 Recession, and they’re also not
higher for millennials than for older workers (even though media coverage
24
tends to suggest otherwise in both cases).
18 See, e.g., Automatic IRA Act of 2015, H.R. 506, 114th Cong. The latest version of
the congressional Auto-IRA proposal, H.R. 506, still relies on employers to create plans and
exempts those employers with fewer than ten employees from even that obligation. See id.
§ 2.
19 These include Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and California. Look to the States for Innovation, GEORGETOWN UNIV.’S
CTR. FOR RET. INITIATIVES, http://cri.georgetown.edu/states/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
20 DAVID ROLF ET AL., ASPEN INST., PORTABLE BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19
(2016),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/Portable_Benefits_final
2.pdf.
21 The myRA program recently established by the Obama Administration does offer a
federal avenue for payroll-deduction retirement savings, but enrollment in myRA depends
on worker initiative.
See myRA: How It Works, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://myra.gov/how-it-works/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
22 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-15-0528,
Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest
Baby Boomers: Results From a Longitudinal Study 1 (Mar. 31, 2015).
23 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-14-1714,
Employee Tenure in 2014, at 1 (Sept. 18, 2014).
24 See STEVEN F. HIPPLE & EMY SOK, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR,
TENURE
OF
AMERICAN
WORKERS
2–3
(2013),
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But statistics on job-hopping do indicate the existence of a generalized
and long-term shift in employer-employee relations such that both parties
25
increasingly view their relationship as disposable.
For a few decades
now, employers—even healthy employers—have been more willing to lay
off workers in the interests of maximizing shareholder profits, and workers
have become more likely to view their careers in terms of building a
personal brand across employers rather than a record of good service within
26
one company. All of this adds up to an environment in which “the longstanding assumption of long-term attachment between an employee and a
27
single firm has broken down.”
Relatedly, some features of the existing legal and regulatory structure
surrounding employment strongly incentivize employers to create distance
between themselves and workers via reclassification. Reclassification, or
the practice of categorizing workers as “independent contractors” instead of
as “employees,” relieves an employer from fulfilling certain tax and (nonERISA) employee benefits obligations, and it also takes the entire issue of
ERISA benefits off the table. Employers in the “sharing” or “platform”
economy have developed new business models that capitalize on this
distinction between employees and independent contractors, while many
traditional industries like construction and delivery have long relied on a
28
workforce largely composed of independent contractors.
If the move
towards independent contracting and gig work continues, even more
workers will be ineligible for employer-sponsored retirement plans. Even
platform companies are beginning to speak up about this problem: in late
2015, a group of executives, venture capitalists, and policy analysts issued

http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2013/tenure/; Ben Casselman, Enough Already About the JobHopping
Millennials,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(May
5,
2015),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/enough-already-about-the-job-hopping-millennials; Jeanne
Meister, Job Hopping Is the ‘New Normal’ for Millennials: Three Ways to Prevent a Human
Resource
Nightmare,
FORBES
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2012/08/14/job-hopping-is-the-new-normal-formillennials-three-ways-to-prevent-a-human-resource-nightmare/#47323aaf5508.
25 See Declining Employee Loyalty: A Casualty of the New Workplace,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(May
9,
2012),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casualty-of-thenew-workplace/.
26 Wharton professor Adam Cobb observed that “[f]irms have always laid off
workers, but in the 1980s, you started to see healthy firms laying off workers, mainly for
shareholder value. . . . If I’m an employee, that’s a signal to me that I’m not going to let
firms control my career.” Id.
27 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 3 (2004).
28 See generally Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the
Sharing Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. RESP. 1 (2016).
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a joint letter calling for “portable benefits” plans that would follow
29
independent contractors across jobs.
Finally, there’s a fair bit working against those employers who do
categorize their workers as “employees” and who want to sponsor some
sort of retirement plan. Economies of scale prevent most small businesses
from being able to afford mainstream plans, while the range and
complexity of choices often overwhelm small-business owners. In fact,
only 14% of small-business employers sponsor retirement plans of any
30
kind.
It’s true that the market is starting to produce some solutions:
startups like Honest Dollar and ForUsAll offer plans specifically priced for
small businesses with relatively jargon-free descriptions and easy online
31
maintenance.
Some of these plans even support independent
32
contractors. But these are relatively niche options and they replicate the
existing system’s reliance on employer initiative.
The Shadow 401(k) system can address all of these problems because
it is independent of employer intent, resources, and skill. Even under a
Shadow 401(k) system many employers will find it necessary to offer
sponsored benefit plans to recruit high-skill workers. But workers who
would appreciate the ease of an employer-sponsored plan will no longer be
obliged to wait for their employers to make the first move, and workers
whose employers will never make the first move—or workers who are selfemployed or operate in the platform economy—will still have a way to
save more.
At the same time, it’s worth remembering that even adequate Shadow
401(k) savings don’t inevitably translate into a comfortable retirement for
at least three reasons: those savings are vulnerable to market fluctuations (a
challenge that cannot be avoided without some element of federally
guaranteed returns or benefits), they still need to be managed and spent

29 Byron Auguste et al., Common Ground for Independent Workers, MEDIUM (Nov. 9,
2015),
https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/common-ground-for-independent-workers83f3fbcf548f#.ucsxz2uou; see also Nick Hanauer & David Rolf, Shared Security, Shared
Growth, 37 DEMOCRACY, July 2015, at 6, 14 (describing the Shared Security System “as
analogous to Social Security, but encompassing all of the employment benefits traditionally
provided by a full-time salaried job”).
30 CHARLES A. JESZECK, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-748T,
RETIREMENT SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR EMPLOYEES OF SMALL BUSINESSES
8 (2013).
31 See Stacy Cowley, Tailoring Retirement Plans to Companies with a Handful of
Workers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/business/smallbusiness/tailoring-retirement-plans-tocompanies-with-a-handful-of-workers.html.
32 See What Types of Companies or Entities Can Use Honest Dollar?, HONEST
DOLLAR,
https://help.honestdollar.com/hc/en-us/articles/213564288-What-types-ofcompanies-or-entities-can-use-Honest-Dollar- (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
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wisely (a challenge I discuss later in this Essay), and they are taxed very
differently than other capital gains (which I leave for another day).
C. Low Income
Legal scholars concerned with the retirement crisis—whether writing
from within employee benefits, elder law, or tax—all generally focus on
providing the right incentives and the right infrastructure to facilitate
33
savings. This is well and good, since there is much work to be done on
both fronts. Nevertheless, it doesn’t help much to incentivize or facilitate
saving if workers have no money to save.
This is not just a “minimum wage” issue. Technically, only around
three million workers earn below the current federal minimum wage of
$7.25 per hour, and these folks definitely do not have the ability to save for
34
retirement. When we ask whether workers are able to save for retirement,
we’re really discussing workers who earn at or above the minimum wage
and how changes in income affect their behavior. Unfortunately, the BLS
Consumer Expenditure Reports do not distinguish between pensions,
personal insurance, and payments to Social Security, and there’s very little
information available elsewhere on retirement savings relative to income
fluctuation.
A few facts suggest that we may want to pay more attention to
workers’ ability to forego income in the interests of contributing to any
type of retirement scheme. Readers should note that these facts are not
meant to suggest linear causation—that is, they don’t tell us that workers
aren’t saving more because they can’t afford to. But they do suggest that
savings practices (which were likely never ideal for the reasons identified
by behavioral economics scholars) have taken an extra hit thanks to wage

33 See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 14, at 278; Teresa Ghilarducci, Retirement Security
Worse on ERISA’s 40th Anniversary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 453, 459 (2014); Daniel Halperin,
Employer-Based Retirement Income—the Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J.
37, 44 (2003).
34 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1054,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS, 2014, at 1 (2015). Readers should note
that the “three million workers” statistic is highly misleading since state laws require
employers to “top off” a tipped worker’s wages at vastly differing rates (or not at all)—and
even where topping off requirements are comparatively generous, enforcement often
remains weak. See SUZANNE DERSHOWITZ ET AL., FOOD LABOR RESEARCH CTR., WORKING
BELOW THE LINE: HOW THE SUBMINIMUM WAGE FOR TIPPED RESTAURANT WORKERS
VIOLATES
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
STANDARDS
15
(2015),
http://rocunited.org/wp2015b/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/WorkingBelowTheLine_LRR.pdf (discussing wage theft);
Minimum Wage for Tipped Employees, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/tipped.htm (listing the direct wage, tip credit, and overall
minimum wage requirements for each state).
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stagnation, job loss, and financial emergencies associated with the
35
Recession. Consider the following:
• The National Institute on Retirement Security reports that the
average working household has a median retirement account
36
balance of just $2500.
• Pew Trusts states that about 70% of American households qualify
37
as savings-limited, income-constrained, or debt-challenged,
38
while 32% face two or more of these problems. Moreover, this
39
was the case both before and after the Recession.
• The Federal Reserve observes that 57% of respondents who had
savings before 2008 had, largely because of the Recession, used
40
up “some” to “all” of those savings by 2013.
The first two facts point to the general financial strain felt by working
families, while the Federal Reserve’s finding suggests that this strain was
exacerbated by the Recession. Again, this is not to say that we can ignore
bad savings practices. But the assumption characterizing much of the
literature on the retirement crisis—that the problem lies in worker or
employer incentives or taxation—replicates the view that expenditures are
a proxy for valuation. Before we go full steam ahead in our efforts to
change workers’ valuation of saving for retirement or try to capitalize on
workers’ tendency to inaccurately express their valuation, we should ask
41
ourselves whether the proxy really applies. If it doesn’t, and if part of the
issue is that workers simply don’t have enough to save enough, then
scholars and practitioners who are interested in addressing the retirement
crisis must join the larger conversation on employment conditions and
income inequality that is taking place in America today.
35 See generally Michael Lind, Opinion, Can You Have a Good Life if You Don’t
Have
a
Good
Job?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/opinion/sunday/can-you-have-a-good-life-if-you-donthave-a-good-job.html.
36 NARI RHEE & ILANA BOIVIE, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., THE CONTINUING
RETIREMENT SAVINGS CRISIS 1 (2015).
37 ERIN CURRIER ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF FAMILY
BALANCE SHEETS 1 (2015).
38 See id. at 13.
39 Id. at 12.
40 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELLBEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2013, at 2 (2014).
41 The most relevant of these concepts are “willingness to pay” (the amount A is
willing to spend for a widget is a reflection of the value A subjectively ascribes to the
widget) and “income effect” (as A’s income fluctuates, so will A’s consumption). The
problems, of course, are that (1) A is not a rational, self-aware, and self-controlled actor, and
(2) valuation itself fluctuates. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
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THE “MANAGEMENT PROBLEM”

Even workers who manage to set aside enough money during their
careers face the difficult task of managing that money before and after
retirement. This Part considers three kinds of obstacles to the proper
management of retirement savings: poor decisionmaking before retirement,
basic capability and financial literacy, and decisionmaking by retirees
coping with physical or mental decline. It also shows how “Shadow
401(k)s” can help address aspects of the “management problem.”
A. The Long Road to Retirement
During their professional lives, workers must make several decisions
regarding their retirement besides determining how much they’ll save.
What amount should they contribute to an employer-sponsored fund? If
there are different funds they could invest into, which ones should they
choose? In case of an unexpected financial stress that compels them to
draw down on existing resources, how should they treat their retirement
savings relative to their other assets? The whole thing bears more than a
42
passing resemblance to an obstacle course.
It’s just not possible to come up with general answers to these
questions because they are incredibly dependent on context. At the same
time, some choices made by workers are predictable—and predictably
flawed. For example, many workers trigger “leakage[s]” from their 401(k)
accounts—that is, they draw on their retirement savings before
43
retirement. Workers might take out loans against their 401(k) funds, they
might request hardship withdrawals in times of extreme financial need, or
44
they might simply cash out their 401(k)s when shifting to a new job.
Hardship withdrawals come with especially heavy consequences since
workers not only lose accumulated savings but also lose the income those
45
savings might have earned while invested.
Even ostensibly wise
choices—like rolling over 401(k) funds from a previous job into a thirdparty Individual Retirement Account (IRA)—heighten the risk of
46
leakages. And this is hardly a niche problem: Gallup estimates that one in
42 See Monahan, supra note 4, at 478–79 (describing 401(k) employee participation
requirements).
43 See Thomas Olson, Note, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the
Shift to Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 451 (2012).
44 See id. (observing that “[l]eakage manifests itself in three forms: cash outs, loans,
and early withdrawals” (citing Robert Steyer, DC Plan Leakage Problem Alarming,
Solutions
Evasive,
PENSIONS
&
INVS.
(Apr.
4,
2011),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110404/PRINT/304049977)).
45 See id. at 461.
46 This is because IRAs are not as strictly regulated as defined contribution plans, so
IRA withdrawals are easier to effect and subject to lighter penalties. See ALICIA H.
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five participants in an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan has tapped into her
47
plan before retirement.
The hassle, of course, is that workers have virtually their entire preretirement lives in which to encounter financial stresses and trigger
leakages. Moreover, 401(k) leakages are just one type of problem
involving one type of retirement savings device. But even though we can’t
solve all of the problems that come from having to manage money for
multiple pre-retirement decades, we can fix a few key issues. A Shadow
401(k) system could sidestep the entire issue of job change rollovers
because the Shadow 401(k)s would naturally follow workers to each new
job. The system could also avoid the problem of a worker making unwise
and perhaps inconsistent 401(k) investment options with each new job
because the selection would only need to be done once (or a handful of
times, if the worker takes an active interest).
To be sure, we would need to offer more instruction and information
at the time of that initial choice and any subsequent adjustments. And we
would also need to strengthen penalties on in-service withdrawals, loans,
and cash outs, in order to prevent workers from viewing their 401(k)s as
just another savings account. But these steps might also be easier with the
kind of centralized governmental management that comes with Shadow
401(k)s.
B. Capability, Social Capital, and Culture
Of course, all of this decisionmaking assumes a great deal of
capability and financial literacy. Just as workers must constantly assess
their progress to financial security and adjust their investment practices,
retirees must constantly re-assess their rate of expenditure, determine
which assets to draw down on first, and decide how to reconcile
unexpected financial stresses with a fixed income. These are complex
issues even for bright, educated, and financially literate folks, but the
ungraceful truth is that many Americans lack the ability to tackle such
problems.
Some of this is due to inadequate information and education. For
example, one survey asked three basic questions about percentage
48
calculations, simple division, and compound interest. Sixteen percent of
MUNNELL & ANTHONY WEBB, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF LEAKAGES ON
401(K)/IRA ASSETS 2 (2015).
47 Art Swift, One in Five Investors Have Tapped into 401(k) Prematurely, GALLUP
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180311/one-five-investors-tapped-401prematurely.aspx.
48 Olivia S. Mitchell, Retirement Risk Management in Times of Turmoil, 17 ELDER
L.J. 439, 444–45 (2010) (citing Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy
and Retirement Preparedness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, 42 BUS.
ECON. 35, 37–38 (2007)).
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respondents couldn’t answer the percentage question, one-third failed the
division question, and almost 80% of the respondents “did not understand
49
compound interest.”
Even more discouragingly, most people aren’t
aware of their own financial illiteracy. The National Foundation for Credit
Counseling found that about one in five respondents “say they can resolve
their own problems without outside help” while another one in four reach
50
out to their friends and relatives rather than to financial professionals.
The real surprise is that investment decisions and 401(k) leakages are only
as bad as they are.
The good news is that there are some things we can do in this area.
51
People with more general education are likely to make better decisions.
People with some economics or financial literacy education are likely to
52
make better decisions. But it’s not all about education: these decisions
demand a not-insignificant level of capability and analytic skill. I do not
want to make too much of this last point—not only is it decidedly
dispiriting, but our legal system regularly ascribes these positive qualities
53
to citizens.
Moreover, some scholars think that we underestimate
54
citizens’ ability to make intelligent decisions given adequate information.
But it’s worth keeping in mind that the current system of retirement savings
assumes that the average American is either smart enough to make
complicated financial decisions, or smart enough and emotionally secure
enough to recognize when she needs help. That may not be the case.
Of course, “good” decisionmaking—that is, decision-making that
maximizes financial security—also depends heavily on environmental
factors like social capital and culture. Jump$tart, a non-profit advocating
financial literacy education for high school and college students, found that

Id. at 445 (citing Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 37 tbl.1).
NAT’L FOUND. FOR CREDIT COUNSELING, 2015 CONSUMER FINANCIAL LITERACY
SURVEY
4
(2015),
https://www.nfcc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/NFCC_2015_Financial_Literacy_Survey_FINAL.pdf.
51 Mitchell, supra note 48, at 445.
52 Id. at 446.
53 Think, for example, of how the Brandenburg Paradigm does this in the context of
First Amendment law. See Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First
Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 992 (2010) (stating that “implicit in the
Brandenburg paradigm is an image of a proper democratic citizen” possessing “a certain
number of characteristics that are essential to effective participation in a political system
governed by the First Amendment” including “incredulity, rationality, critical intelligence,
insensitivity to political slights, and an understanding of the political protocols that
accompany an orderly transfer of power”).
54 See Jennifer Nou, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative CostBenefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 642 (2008) (“[T]here is little basis for
assuming that lay citizens will be unable to appreciate or comprehend technical
information.” (citing STUART HILL, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
55–89 (1992))).
49
50
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students’ ability to answer a basic question about smart debt correlated to
specific demographic categories like race (whites fared better) and gender
(males at the high school level and females at the college level fared
55
better).
These differences reflect the fact that some groups inherit
positive social capital (like financial sophistication) while others inherit
56
negative social capital (like having poor relatives). On top of all this,
financial practices are tied to cultural notions of responsibility: some
groups may place a higher value on assisting needy relatives or leaving
57
bequests, while others may prioritize real property ownership.
The current system of employer-sponsored defined contribution plans
is structured as if differences in intelligence, education, social capital, and
cultural values don’t exist. It demands that people who may lack
significant financial literacy nonetheless make complex decisions early on
and repeatedly throughout their lives. It also demands that people who
aren’t fortunate enough to have an employer-sponsored plan—the same
people who are also likely lower on formal education and social capital—
display extra initiative and financial acumen by investigating and acquiring
IRAs. And finally, the system has no way of coping with the fact that
reasonable people can disagree about how to use resources. This last
problem is a strange twist on the idea that workers lack incentives rather
than income because it essentially assumes that we all have exactly the
same incentives (saving as much as possible). We don’t.
A Shadow 401(k) system eliminates the first two problems because it
involves fewer decisions during an individual’s working life, a default
annuity purchase at retirement, and it covers any participant in the labor
force regardless of legal classification or the availability of employersponsored plans. It also mitigates the disparity between those who value
saving and those who prioritize other things like assisting family or
investing in real property. Admittedly, it does so by taking away some
decisionmaking power from people who would prefer not to save. But the
truth is that this aspect of the Shadow 401(k) system is no more
paternalistic than Social Security, and the current system doesn’t offer
these individuals much of a choice either: they may get to buy that home or
help that relative, but only at the cost of a painful and impoverished old
age.

55 LEWIS MANDELL, JUMP$TART COAL. FOR PERS. FIN. LITERACY, THE FINANCIAL
LITERACY OF YOUNG AMERICAN ADULTS: RESULTS OF THE 2008 NATIONAL JUMP$TART
COALITION SURVEY OF HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS AND COLLEGE STUDENTS 167 (2009).
56 See Allison Courtney Scott, Ethnic Differences in Reliance on Family Versus
Personal Savings in the Face of a Financial Shock 8–9 (2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
University of Colorado) (on file with author).
57 See id. at 7–10 (arguing that blacks may prioritize assisting needy relatives or
leaving bequests, while Hispanics may do the same for real property ownership).
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C. Physical & Mental Fitness
Even if retirees have the money, know-how, and social capital
necessary to ensure their own comfort, they must do so at a time when they
58
are confronted by physical and mental deterioration. Age-related decline
is an unpleasant and tricky thing to consider, not least because there is an
incredible diversity of opinion within the scientific community as to when,
how, and at what rate we experience reductions in physical and mental
59
capacity. But since it seems relatively certain that some decline is likely
for almost all individuals, it’s worth asking how decline affects outcomes
under the current system and whether the Shadow 401(k) offers any
60
improvements.
We can sort cognitive decline issues into two broad categories based
on the retirement-related problems they generate: memory loss and
cognitive impairment. Memory loss can complicate tasks that retirees must
perform under the existing system, like deciding whether to withdraw more
than the minimum distribution requirement, picking the funds from which
they’ll withdraw assets each year, and determining whether and how they’ll
reallocate assets after withdrawals. Retirees suffering memory loss will
probably find it more taxing to make these choices and may make some
mistakes because they’ll have trouble juggling all the data points that go
into an ostensibly simple decision like how much to withdraw from a
401(k). The default annuity purchase feature of Shadow 401(k)s means
that retirees with memory loss needn’t go through this process every year
unless, at retirement, they are so actively involved in managing their
61
finances that they elect out of the annuity purchase.
Cognitive impairment can vary across a fairly broad spectrum, ranging
from brain-based changes that hamper affective processing to Mild
62
Cognitive Impairment to various forms of dementia.
Overall, 30% of

58 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Rethinking ERISA’s Promise of Income Security in a
World of 401(k) Plans, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 384–87 (2014); Frolik, supra note 14, at 292.
59 See, e.g., Timothy A. Salthouse, When Does Age-Related Cognitive Decline
Begin?, 30 NEUROBIOLOGY OF AGING 507, 508–09 (2009).
60 See IAN STUART-HAMILTON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGEING: AN INTRODUCTION 111
(5th ed. 2012) (arguing that “short-term memory tasks . . . present compelling evidence of
an age-related decline”).
61 On the importance of annuitization, see generally Jonathan Barry Forman,
Removing the Legal Impediments to Offering Lifetime Annuities in Pension Plans, 22 CONN.
INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
62 See Aging, Memory Loss and Dementia: What’s the Difference?, ALZHEIMER’S
ASS’N,
,
http://www.alz.org/mnnd/documents/aging_memory_loss_and_dementia_what_is_the_diffe
rence.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2016); Mariann R. Weierich et al., Older and Wiser? An
Affective Science Perspective on Age-Related Challenges in Financial Decision Making, 6
SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 195, 198 (2011).
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Americans above age eighty-five are thought to be living with some form
63
of dementia.
Men and women aged sixty-five have a 11% and 19%
lifetime risk, respectively, of developing Alzheimer’s—probably the most
well-known form of dementia as well as one of its more severe
64
variations—and that risk increases exponentially with age.
Depending on the severity of the impairment, retirees suffering from
dementia may be incapable of making the annual decisions demanded by
traditional 401(k)s. Consequently, they stand to benefit from the default
annuity feature of Shadow 401(k)s even more than retirees with simple
memory loss. Default annuity purchases may also help address the large
but underreported phenomenon of elder financial abuse, at least insofar as
they commit a retiree’s Shadow 401(k) balance to small-increment
disbursals rather than lump sum withdrawals.
Physical deterioration can also impact a retiree’s ability to manage her
money, even when that deterioration is something as run of the mill as
sensory decline. A recent study of adults aged fifty-five and above found
that about one-third of men classified as “Seeing and Hearing Disabled”
required assistance with personal finances, as did around 15% of men
65
classified as “Hearing Disabled but Seeing Abled.” Sensory decline can
often also lead to cognitive impairment if an individual doesn’t remain
socially engaged—and, unsurprisingly, many elders suffering from sensory
66
decline tend to isolate themselves.
Moreover, people experiencing
sensory impairment often pretend that they’re unaffected, which makes it
difficult for even the most skilled and well-meaning third-party to act in a
67
retiree’s interest.
And all of this is aside from any major medical
conditions that may directly damage a retiree’s finances or impact her
ability to think strategically in her own long-term interest.
CONCLUSION
No one solution is going to rescue our decidedly imperfect retirement
system while satisfying taxpayers, and the Shadow 401(k) is hardly an
63 Margaret Gatz, Genetics, Dementia, and the Elderly, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 123, 123 (2007).
64 Id.
65 Parminder Raina et al., The Relationship Between Sensory Impairment and
Functional Independence Among Elderly, 4 BMC GERIATRICS, December 2004, at 6.
66 Nicholas R. Nicholson, A Review of Social Isolation: An Important but
Underassessed Condition in Older Adults, 33 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 137, 140–42 (2012);
Yukari Yamada et al., Joint Associations of Dual Sensory Impairment and No-Activity
Involvement With 1-Year Mortality in Nursing Homes: Results From the SHELTER Study,
71 J. GERONTOLOGY BIOLOGICAL SCI. & MED. SCI. 643, 644 (2016).
67 See Susan Seliger, Why Won’t They Get Hearing Aids?, N.Y. TIMES: THE NEW OLD
AGE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/whywont-they-get-hearing-aids/.
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exception to this rule. Shadow 401(k)s force wealth accumulation, rather
than provide replacement income, and they still require a not-insignificant
level of financial knowledge on the part of workers who may not even have
a high school education. These problems will never truly disappear so long
as we structure retirement around defined contribution plans where workers
must make decisions affecting their own financial futures and bear the
consequences of those decisions. Shadow 401(k)s also still leave retirees
vulnerable to fluctuations in the stock market, and consequently without a
guaranteed amount of funds for retirement. This problem will never
disappear so long as we are unwilling to put the full faith and credit of the
federal government behind potential solutions. And Shadow 401(k)s also
do not guarantee that workers earn enough to save enough for retirement.
This problem will not disappear until we ask ourselves what workers need
to earn so that they can cover both present spending and retirement saving
in the way our system demands.
But if we’re going to address the “retirement crisis,” we have to be
open to multiple solutions that each effect incremental improvements. The
Shadow 401(k) does just this. Because it follows workers from job to job,
defaults into age-appropriate investment funds with minimal (but non-zero)
opportunities for individualization, and because it attaches heightened
requirements and penalties to leakages, the Shadow 401(k) reduces the
odds that individuals will harm themselves through poor decisionmaking
during their working lives. Similarly, because it defaults into an annuity
purchase at retirement, the Shadow 401(k) lowers the financial literacy and
personal capability needed to manage savings after retirement. And lastly,
because it applies regardless of employment classification, the Shadow
401(k) includes all participants in the labor force while functioning
independently of employer intent, resources, and skill.
Most importantly, however, the Shadow 401(k) is within the realm of
political possibility. To be sure, nothing is easy to achieve in Congress
these days. But the Shadow 401(k) requires no new administrative
apparatus, no “tax,” no added cost to employers, and no pledging of the
United States’ full faith and credit. It doesn’t try to buck the trend of
defined contribution plans, and it doesn’t sigh for America to be like
Denmark. For these reasons, the Shadow 401(k) isn’t as aggressive a
68
response to the retirement crisis as some other proposals. At the same
time—and for these same reasons—it may be a viable (and pliable) first
step on the road to resolution.

68 See, e.g., GHILARDUCCI, supra note 16, at 17; Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J.
Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 759, 774–807 (2015); Frolik, supra note
14, at 320–30.

